A nd follow ing this, I discuss the relationship betw een the the existence of the external world is not questioned until the introduction of the Deceiver Hypothesis. First, most commentators hold that the pri mary aim of the dream ing passage is to raise the worry about whether we are awake. Cf., for example, E. M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics (Cam bridge: Harvard University Press, 1978) Press, 1986) , . So understood, the Dreaming Argum ent is often thought to presuppose an external world in which to wake up. Sec ond, a popular reading of the passage introducing the Deceiver Hypothesis has it that the existence of the external, corporeal world is being called into question-for the first time-by this more radical doubt. Margaret Wilson, for example, in her Descartes (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978) , 16f., appeals to this reading for her view that it is merely the nature, but not the existence, of the external world that is in doubt as a result of the dream ing passage.
D ream in g A rgu m en t, as typically u nderstood, and the argu m en t I propose in con n ection with unknow n faculties.
1 . U nkn ow n Faculties and the A rgu m en t fo r the E xtern al W orld first, that my sensory ideas o f b od y are, at least in part, caused by som eth ing extern al to m e, and second, that there exists an exter nal, co rp o real w orld. I shall re fe r to these as the External Cause Thesis and the C o rp orea l Existence Thesis, respectively.4 Descar 3In the Second Replies, Descartes describes the orderliness o f his pro cedure, noting that " the items which are put forward first must be known entirely without the aid o f what comes later; and the remaining items must be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before" (AT 7:155, CSM 2:110) . Cf. also AT 7:9-10.
A T ' refers to Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964)); 'CSM' refers to The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) ); 'CSMK' refers to volume 3 o f CSM, for which Anthony Kenny is a contributing translator. References to both AT and CSM are to the volume and page. h e two theses are logically independent. Not only is the denial o f the External Cause Thesis consistent with the truth o f the Corporeal Existence Thesis, the truth o f the External Cause Thesis is consistent with the denial o f the Corporeal Existence Thesis, since my sensory ideas o f body may be transmitted to me directly from God (or some other noncorporeal sub stance). I know by experience that these ideas do not depend on my will, and hence that they do not depend simply on me. Frequently I notice 5Midway through the Fourth Meditation, the meditator is still in doubt whether his own thinking nature " is distinct from this corporeal nature or identical with it" (AT 7:59, CSM 2:41). Though much o f the groundwork for establishing the real distinction is laid in the Second Meditation, it is not until the Sixth Meditation that Descartes thinks he has all the premises he needs (cf. AT 7:13, 7:129, 3:266, and 3:272) . Even when finally in place, however, the conclusion that mind and body are distinct substances does not entail the Corporeal Existence Thesis, since Cartesian dualism con cerns the ontological independence o f mind and body but not their real existence. In the Principles 1.60, Descartes says that we know that " two substances are really distinct simply from the fact that we can clearly and distinctly understand one apart from the other" ; and this we can know o f mind and body " even though we may not yet know for certain that any extended or corporeal substance exists in reality" (AT 8a:28, CSM 1:213). them even when I do not want to: now, for example, I feel the heat whether I want to or not, and this is why I think that this sensation or idea o f heat comes to me from something other than myself, namely the heat o f the fire by which I am sitting. (AT 7:38, CSM 2:26)6
In matters relatin g to the go o d , however, he often experien ces inclinations that seem both to origin ate fro m som e in tern al faculty (w ithin h im ) and to oppose his will, a fact w hich u n d erm in es the argum ent:
Then again, although these [seemingly adventitious] ideas do not de pend on my will, it does not follow that they must come from things located outside me. Just as the impulses which I was speaking o f a moment ago seem opposed to my will even though they are within me, so there may be some other faculty not yet fully known to me, which produces these ideas without any assistance from external things. (AT 7:39, CSM 2:27; italics mine)
T h e expressed w orry is that his m in d may have the faculty o f p rod u cin g his sensory ideas, even thou gh in trospection reveals n o such p o ten tia l.7 I shall h erea fter re fe r to this as the U nknow n Fac ulty D ou b t (U F D ):
U FD : I have reason to w o rry that the sensory experien ces that I take as n orm al and w aking are p rod u ced by som e un known, in tern al faculty (w ith ou t any assistance fro m ex ternal things).
Because o f U FD , he opts to w ith h old ju d g m e n t about the C o rp o real Existence Thesis:
[I] t is not reliable judgement but merely some blind impulse that has made me believe up till now that there exist things distinct from myself which transmit to me ideas or images o f themselves through the sense organs or in some other way.
But it now occurs to me that there is another way o f investigating 6Cf. also the Sixth Meditation, AT 7:75. 7In his Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, Descartes explains that he is supposing that " the term 'faculty' denotes nothing but a potentiality" (AT 8b:361, CSM 1:305). In his prelu de to the Sixth M ed itation p ro o f, the m editator re iterates the ro le o f U FD in u n d erm in in g his initial argum ent, w hile suggesting that his earlier doubts m igh t n ow be unwarranted:
And despite the fact that the perceptions o f the senses were not de pendent on my will, I did not think that I should on that account infer that they proceeded from things distinct from myself, since I might perhaps have a faculty not yet known to me which produced them.
But now, when I am beginning to achieve a better knowledge o f myself and the author o f my being, although I do not think I should heedlessly accept everything I seem to have acquired from the senses, neither do I think that everything should be called into doubt. (AT 7: 77-78, CSM 2:53-54)
As we shall see, the referen ce, h ere, to an increased kn ow led ge o f h im self and o f G o d fo reb o d e s the argum en t to com e. I turn n ow to the argu m en t itself, and I sum m arize the first stage as follows.
8Prior to proving the existence o f God by means o f the famous causal principle-" that there must be at least as much in the efficient and total cause as in the effect o f that cause" (AT 7:40, CSM 2:28)-the meditator attempts to prove the Corporeal Existence Thesis by the very same means. On the basis o f the principle, he notes: " If the objective reality o f any o f my ideas turns out to be so great that I am sure the same reality does not reside in me, either formally or eminently, and hence that I myself cannot be its cause, it will necessarily follow that I am not alone in the world, but that some other thing which is the cause o f this idea also exists" (AT 7:42, CSM 2:29). As it turns out, however, neither his sensory ideas o f corporeal substance (AT 7:43-44) nor his clear and distinct ideas o f corporeal sub stance are such that they could not have originated from some faculty o f his own mind. And so, this unsuccessful effort at establish ing the External Cause Thesis serves merely to reinforce UFD.
9There is an attempt at establishing the existence o f corporeal things that occurs early in the Sixth Meditation, an argument based on a consid eration o f the operations o f the imagination (AT 7:71-73). However, Des cartes thinks it supports only a " probable conjecture," and he dismisses the conclusion as " only a probability" (AT 7:73, CSM 2:51).
( 1 ) I am a substance whose w h ole essence is thou gh t and am really distinct fro m co rp o real (e x te n d e d ) substance. A t first glance, the argum en t o f the second stage appears to be a rehash o f the m ed itato r's form er, naive e ffo r t at establishing the existence o f extern al things. In that effo rt, the fact that his seem ingly adventitious sensory ideas cam e to him in d ep en d en tly o f his w ill-as established by in trospection -was taken as inadequate grou nds fo r in ferrin g an extern al cause o f such ideas, precisely because o f U FD . A n d yet, h ere in the Sixth M ed itation argum ent, the m editator infers that the faculty causing his sensory ideas is extern al to him , since, as he says, " the ideas in question are p ro 10Our sensory ideas (qua their objective reality) o f body are not ideas o f the essence o f body, as the earlier wax passage is supposed to show; nor are they ideas o f the essence o f mind. At best, then, they are ideas o f modes, though it is not until later in the Sixth Meditation that the medi tator discovers what these modes are referred to (AT 7:82-83; c f Principles 1.48). As such, it is consistent with Descartes's causal principle (namely, that there be as much formal reality in the cause o f an idea as there is objective reality in the idea itself) that the causes o f our sensory ideas are themselves modes.
n By this point in the Meditations, the conception o f (created) substance as " a thing capable o f existing independently" (o f any other creature) has been articulated (AT 7:44, CSM 2:30), as has the relationship o f substance to mode (cf. AT 7:44-45). 273; CSMK, 165 -6 6 ).12 T h e payoff, accord in g to Descartes, is that transparency o f thou gh t guarantees that in trospection will reveal the operations o f all m ental faculties (know n o r u n k n ow n ); that is, (2 ) F or any faculty (know n o r u nknow n) in m e, I am aware o f it w hen its operations occur.
In the T h ird M ed itation, the m editator had n o t yet established that his entire essence was thought, a fact that renders in trospection inconclu sive;13 in the Sixth M ed itation , (1 ) having been estab lished, in trospection m igh t succeed.
12This comes from a letter to Mersenne (31 December 1640) in which, among other things, he and Mersenne are discussing amendments to the text o f the First Replies. Among the First Replies items they discuss is a reference, by Descartes, to the transparency doctrine (AT 7:107). Though I have been unable to locate this letter from Mersenne as extant, it appears that Mersenne had inquired as to where, in the Meditations, Descartes proves the doctrine.
13In the Third Meditation, Descartes does invoke the transparency doc trine, but he is careful to add a qualification: " For since I am nothing but a thinking thing-or at least since I am now concerned only and precisely with that part of me which is a thinking thing-if there were such a power in me, I should undoubtedly be aware o f it" (AT 7:49, CSM 2:33-34; italics mine). Though, as the Second Meditation is supposed to show, " we do not rec ognize anything corporeal" in the soul, Descartes does not yet think he has established " that there is nothing corporeal in the soul" (AT 9a:215, CSM 2:276; cf. note 5 above). Descartes thinks this Third Meditation appeal to transparency is legitimate precisely because it occurs in a context where the possibility o f unknown corporeal faculties has been bracketed (AT 7: 107).
In his " Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency,"
Descartes has in m in d two (p a rtia l) defin ition s, those o f thinking thing and thought, w hich serve as in te rm e d ia te prem ises in the in fe re n c e fro m ( 1 ) to ( 2 ): ( i) any o p era tio n (in c lu d in g those o f unknow n facu lties) attribu ted to a thinking thing is itself a thou gh t;
(ii) th ere is n o thought " o f w hich we are n o t aware at the very m o m e n t w hen it is in us" (A T 7:246, CSM 2:171). C o n c e rn in g ( i ) , the m ed ita to r rem arks (im m ed ia tely fo llo w in g the p r o o f fo r
(1)):
Besides this, I find in myself faculties for certain special modes o f thinking, namely imagination and sensory perception. Now I can clearly and distinctly understand myself as a whole without these fac ulties; but I cannot, conversely, understand these faculties without me, that is, without an intellectual substance to inhere in. This is because there is an intellectual act14 included in their essential def inition; and hence I perceive that the distinction between them and myself corresponds to the distinction between the modes o f a thing and the thing itself. ( 14In referring to an intellectual act (intellectionem), Descartes is not re ferring to action as opposed to passion, but to an actuality as opposed to a mere potentiality or faculty. As such, he uses 'act' , in this context, to refer to a thing's operations or modes or ways o f being.
15In the Principles 1.53, Descartes writes that " each substance has one principal property which constitutes its nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes the nature o f corporeal substance; and thought consti tutes the nature o f thinking substance. Everything else which can be at tributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode o f an ex tended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is simply one o f the various modes o f thinking" (AT 8a:25, CSM 1:210).
there are other faculties (like those o f changing position, o f taking on various shapes, and so on) which, like sensory perception and imagination, cannot be understood apart from some substance for them to inhere in, and hence cannot exist without it. But it is clear that these other faculties, if they exist, must be in a corporeal or extended substance and not an intellectual one; for the clear and distinct conception o f them includes extension, but does not include any intellectual act whatsoever. (A T 7:78-79, CSM 2:54-55). I use this term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware o f it. Thus all the operations o f the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts. (AT 7:160, CSM 2:113)
As fo rm u la ted , how ever, (2 ) does n o t lo o k to be en ou g h to gu aran tee that in trosp ection w ill ru le o u t U FD . 16 T h e o b jectio n , then, is this: I can be sure 16In a letter to Regius, Descartes explains this action-passion distinction by analogy to body: " [W ]e call it an 'action' when the motion is considered in the body that imparts the motion, and a 'passion' when it is considered in the body that is moved. It follows from this that when the terms are extended to immaterial things, there is something in such things which has to be considered as analogous to motion. So we should use the term 'action' for what plays the role o f a moving force, like volition in the mind, while we apply the term 'passion' to what plays the role o f something moved, like intellection and vision in the same mind" CSMK, 199) . Now as far as ideas are concerned, provided they are considered solely in themselves and I do not refer them to anything else, they cannot strictly speaking be false; for whether it is a goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is just as true that I imagine the form er as the latter. As for the will and the emotions, here too one need not worry about falsity; for even if the things which I may desire are wicked or even non-existent, that does not make it any less true that I desire them. C o n sid er (3 ). As the m ed ita to r observes:
Now there is in me a passive faculty o f sensory perception, that is, a faculty for receiving and recognizing the ideas o f sensible objects; but I could not make use o f it unless there was also an active faculty, 17Since the nature o f thought and thinking substance remains the same whether one is awake or asleep, the implications o f and (2) and (2 )' extend not only to waking experiences but to dream experiences as well (c f Prin ciples 1.9).
either in me or in something else, which produced or brought about these ideas. ( 18There is, o f course, an additional assumption involved in the infer ence, namely, that the operations o f the active faculty in question are si multaneous with the sensory ideas in relation to which they are active. Since Descartes rejects the possibility o f action at a (temporal) distance, he supposes " it is contradictory that there should be a passivity without an activity for even a single moment" (AT 3:428, CSMK 193) .
19In the case o f voluntary sensory ideas (voluntary imaginings), I am aware o f an active cause. Descartes holds that brain events are also active with respect to these ideas, since the needed memory is located in the brain (cf. Passions 1.1 on the relational aspect o f the action-passion distinc tion). But in such cases, my volitional activity provides what is, in effect, the triggering active cause.
20N o w one might worry that this interference does not go through, since it may be possible that acts o f willing are sometimes unsuccessful, as in the following scenario: Suppose I am aware o f the doing that aims at bringing about the idea o f a triangle, and yet, unknown to me, this same activity turns out to be the active cause o f the sensory ideas that I take as " involuntary." If this is possible, then one might have volitional awareness But this faculty cannot be in me, since clearly it presupposes no in tellectual act on my part, and the ideas in question are produced without my cooperation and often even against my will. So the only alternative is that it is in another substance distinct from me-a sub stance which contains either formally or eminently all the reality which exists objectively in the ideas produced by this faculty (as I have just noted).21 (A T 7:79, CSM 2:54-55) By in trosp ection , then, the m ed ita to r is able to deal with the two rem a in in g o p tion s in vok ed by U FD co n c e rn in g the relation sh ip b etw een his own th o u gh t and the faculty causing his in volu n tary sensory ideas o f b o d y :22 both (c ) and (d ) can n ow be ru led ou t with respect to the active faculty causing these sensory ideas. H a v in g established that his whole essence is thou gh t, the a rgu m en t by in trosp ection n ow succeeds w h ere the T h ird M ed ita tio n e ffo r t failed.
B e fo re m o vin g on to the th ird stage o f the argum en t, I want to p o in t ou t that th ere is n o th in g said, in the secon d stage, that is in com p a tib le with the th e o ry o f in nate ideas, even th ou gh Des o f the sort specified in (2 )' without thereby being aware o f which passivities the volition was in fact bringing about. One obvious solution would be to further strengthen the transparency doctrine so as to allow for an aware ness o f mental-to-mental causal relations. I suspect that Descartes holds some such account, but since the texts are inconclusive I have relied on the weaker statement o f the doctrine in (2)'.
21In the Principles II. 1 version o f the argument for the Corporeal Exis tence Thesis, Descartes appears to arrive hastily at the External Cause The sis-in a manner quite insufficient to rule out UFD-and then focus pri marily on what is, in the Sixth Meditation account, the third stage. But in fact the Principles account is not so reckless as this: the counterpart to the first stage (o f the Meditations account) is established in Principles 1.8, and the transparency o f mind is elucidated in 1.9. These establish the central claims that would be needed to rule out UFD.
Bear in mind, as well, that the two works are written in very different styles-the Meditations is written much more according to the method o f analysis than is the Principles. The Sixth Meditation account occurs in the context o f a highly systematic treatment o f radical doubt, which is given only perfunctory treatment in the Principles. Whereas proving the incor poreality o f the mind and its real distinction from the body are important metaphysical tasks in the Meditations, Descartes treats them in summary form in the Principles. This is consistent with his characterization o f the latter (that is, that portion in which such matters are treated) as an abridged version o f the material in the Meditations (AT 5:291).
22Namely, (c) the faculty is a mode o f his thought, and (d) the faculty just is his thought. T h e key to this stage o f the a rgu m en t is the appeal to divin e b e n evo len ce in ( 8 ), an appeal that presupposes elem en ts o f the th eod icy ea rlie r w ork ed ou t in the Fou rth M e d ita tio n .24 G ra n tin g But since God is not a deceiver, it is quite clear that he does not transmit the ideas to me either directly from himself, or indirectly, via some creature which contains the objective reality o f the ideas not formally but only eminently. For God has given me no faculty at all for recognizing any such source for these ideas; on the contrary, 24In my " Cartesian Theodicy and the Criterion o f Truth" (unpubli shed) , I offer an analysis o f the Fourth Meditation theodicy Descartes relies on here. One consequence o f the theodicy is that God (as an essentially omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being) is compatible only with those judgment errors that we have the capacity to correct. Since, then, we are inclined to think (concerning the options in (7 )) that (i) is the case rather than (ii) or (iii), and we are incapable o f correcting our error (on the assumption that we are in error), it follows that we are not in error-since " God is not a deceiver," there is a " consequent impossibility o f there being any falsity in [our] opinions which cannot be corrected by some other faculty supplied by God" (AT 7:80, CSM 2:55-56). This ex plains, in part, why UFD is not included as a fourth option in (7) and eliminated along with (ii) and (iii) by the appeal to benevolence in (8): on the assumption that an unknown mental faculty is the active cause o f our involuntary sensory ideas, and thus that (i) is false, we do have the capacity, thinks Descartes, for correcting the resulting error-namely, by means o f introspection, as occurred in the second stage o f the argument.
he has given me a great propensity to believe that they are produced by corporeal things. So I do not see how God could be understood to be anything but a deceiver if the ideas were transmitted from a source other than corporeal things. It follows that corporeal things exist. (A T 7:79-80, CSM 2:55)
T h e a rgu m en t establishes that the active cause o f all in volu n tary sensory ideas is co rp o re a l substance, and it does so even th ou gh the m e d ita to r is n o t yet sure w hat his own b o d y is like (assum ing he has o n e ). Descartes h olds that even n on verid ica l, in volu n tary sensory ideas are actively caused by co rp o re a l sub stance, as he explains in the Passions:
Am ong the perceptions caused by the [human] body, most o f them depend on the nerves. But there are some which do not and which, like those I have just described [voluntary imaginings] , are called 'imaginings' . These differ from the others, however, in that our will is not used in form ing them. Accordingly they cannot be numbered among the actions o f the soul, for they arise simply from the fact that the spirits, being agitated in various different ways and coming upon the traces o f various impressions which have preceded them in the brain, make their way by chance through certain pores rather than others. Such are the illusions o f our dreams and also the day dreams we often have when we are awake and our mind wanders idly without applying itself to anything o f its own accord.25 (A T 11:344 45, CSM 1:336)
In d e e d , it is critical that the a rgu m en t apply to the case o f dream s, since at this stage o f the Sixth M ed ita tio n the m e d ita to r has n o t yet ru led ou t the possibility that he is at presen t a sleep .26 2 . T h e Stan d ard In te rp retatio n R e v isited R ecall that a cco rd in g to the standard in terp retatio n , (A ) skeptical doubts abou t the C o rp o re a l E xisten ce Th esis 25Cf. also AT 6:141 and 3:424-25. To the extent that dreams are thought to be actively caused by the motion o f various spirits, humors, and vapors in the body, Descartes is in agreement with the Aristotelian view (cf. Summa Theologica la.111.3, la.84.8, and De Somniss II 461a).
26The supposition that he might be asleep begins in the First Meditation (cf. AT 7:19 and 7:23) and remains in place until the very end o f the Sixth Meditation where it is then challenged (AT 7:89f.). (1 1 ) is tru e-at least, to the ex ten t that o n e in itially h eld to som e ver sion o f ( l l ) ; 28 m oreover, its truth co u ld be established directly, 27Indeed, Descartes intends the meditator to be, in part, a spokesperson for the Aristotelian: " I had nothing at all in the intellect which I had not previously had in sensation" (AT 7:75, CSM 2:52). See note 55 below. 33While we take true and false to be properties o f propositions, the an cients took them to be properties o f perceptions as well (cf. our use o f 'veridical' and 'nonveridical' ).
34Cf. also Acad. II 56-58 and 49-50. 35If, for any X-type experience, it were wholly indistinguishable from any F-type experience, the supposition that these really are distinct kinds would be problematic. (Cf., e.g., J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), chap. 5.) But the Academics did not deny that there are sufficient grounds for us to make discriminations between the two kinds o f experiences in order to classify them as distinct; consider, for instance, that we discriminate between those experiences we call dreams and those we call waking, in part, on the basis o f waking-up experiences (cf. Acad. II 51-52).
A c c o rd in g to AST, we w ou ld be unjustified in in fe rrin g that exter nal objects cause the sensory experien ces we take as n orm al, wak in g ones, i f there w ere a second class o f experiences, qualitatively indistinguishable fro m the first, fo r w hich we w ere u nw illin g to m ake such an in feren ce-" the man w ho has a presentation o f the true and the false that is co m m on to both can not have any crite rion o r any m ark o f truth at a ll" (Acad. II 33) .36
Since there are such classes o f n on veridical perception s (qu ali tatively indistinguishable fro m those we take as n orm a l and wak in g ), the veracity o f n orm a l p ercep tio n was called in to dou bt in accordance with AST. T h e classes o f perception s that the A ca d em ics cited w ere those ex p erien c ed in madness and dream s:37 36In this respect, the strategy o f the Academics differs from a standard Pyrrhonian tactic with respect to the reality o f sensible objects. While the skeptical attitude o f the Academics towards cognitive impression is based on similarity, the Pyrrhonian attitude in such contexts is typically based on difference. The Pyrrhonian suspends judgment towards both x and y, since they differ and there is no criterion for preferring the one over the otheras with the tower in the distance that appears round from one perspective while square from another. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of [58] [59] [60] 37Note also that Thomas cites Augustine as appealing to the following argument, one that undermines the veracity o f the senses by appeal to madness and dreams:
[Everything that we sense by means of the body we also receive in images, even when the things are not present to the senses (as for instance in sleep or in a rage). Yet we cannot distinguish by means of the senses whether we are perceiving the sensible things themselves or false images, and nothing can be perceived which is indistinguishable from what is false. (Summa la.8 4 .6 , trans. Paul T. Durbin (Blackfriars edition, 1 9 6 4 , vol. Then, since the mind is capable o f entirely self-originated motion, as is manifest by our faculty o f mental imagination and by the visions that sometimes appear to men either when asleep or mad, it is prob able that the mind may also be set in motion in such a manner that not only it cannot distinguish whether the presentations in question [the Stoic cognitive impressions] are true or false but that there really is no difference at all between them: just as if people were to shiver and turn pale either o f themselves as a result o f some mental emotion or in consequence o f encountering some terrifying external object, with nothing to distinguish between the two kinds o f shivering and pallor, and without any difference between the internal state o f feeling and the one that came from without. Consequently there is only one way o f routing the difficulty about 38In the later Montaigne, who was influenced by both the Pyrrhonian and the Academic traditions, we find an appeal to dreaming which (like that in the Academics) invokes the skeptical worry that the very same kind o f mental capacities or faculties that account for sleeping experiences may also account for waking ones:
Those who have compared our life to a dream were perhaps more right than they thought. When we dream, our soul lives, acts, exercises all her faculties, neither more nor less than when she is awake . . . Since our reason and our soul accept the fancies and opinions which arise in it while sleeping, and au thorize the actions of our dreams with the same approbation as they do those of the day, why do we not consider the possibility that our thinking, our acting, may be another sort of dreaming, and our waking another kind of sleep? ("Apology for Raymond Sebond," in The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 5 7 ), 4 5 1 )
Notice there is an implicit appeal, here, to something like AST: since in sleep it seems I am awake, perhaps my waking experiences are no more credible than my sleeping experiences. unreal presentations, whether depicted by the imagination, which we admit frequently to take place, or in slumber or under the influence o f wine or o f insanity: we shall declare that all presentations o f this nature are devoid o f perspicuity, to which we are bound to cling tooth and nail. For who when feigning to himself an imaginary picture o f some object, the moment he bestirs himself and recalls his self-con sciousness does not at once perceive the difference between perspic uous presentations and unreal ones? The same applies to dreams. and, continues C icero, " this is the o n e argu m en t that has h eld the fie ld dow n to the presen t day" (Acad. II 77-7 8) . 40 As I h op e to show, it is n o co in cid en ce that Descartes appeals to madness and d rea m in g in the First M ed itation. In his S econd R e plies, he in form s us n o t only o f his fam iliarity with the skeptical literatu re,41 but also that he views his own First M ed ita tion argu ments as a rehash o f the argum ents o f the A cadem ics and Skeptics (A T 7:130); he adds, in the T h ird Replies, that he " was n o t trying to sell them as n ovelties" (A T 7:171, CSM 2:121).42 39Cf. also Acad. II 52-54. 40In their later sequel to the Academic-Stoic debate, Scotus took much the same position as the Stoics (in his response to Henry o f Ghent): Scotus denied that the experiences o f dreams and madness are in fact indistin guishable from waking experiences (Philosophical Writings, (1982): 3-40, has argued that no ancient skeptic worried that the whole totality o f our sensory per ceptions might be false (that idealism might be true and there might be no external w orld). Given the scope o f Cartesian doubt, says Burnyeat, if it is the result o f a " rehash o f ancient skepticism, the implied claim is that the traditional material supports a doubt more radical than the traditional skeptic had dared suppose" (37). First, I should point out that in my re marks, thus far, I have made only the relatively weak claim that in Cicero we find ancient skeptics who appealed to madness and dreaming in order to generate a worry akin to UFD. But this is not (yet) the radical Cartesian doubt that Burnyeat has in mind, a doubt that carries with it the Cartesian view o f the mind. Despite, however, that in my presentation thus far I am not at odds with Burnyeat, it seems to me that Burnyeat's thesis is worth disputing. In his Contra Academicos (bk. Ill, chaps. 10-11), Augustine attri butes to Carneades a skepticism about the existence o f the world-a worry his Carneades raises on the basis o f a consideration o f madness and dream ing. In his rejoinder to Carneades, Augustine argues that we cannot doubt the existence o f the world so long as we limit 'world' to the scope o f appearances. Since, then (as Burnyeat concedes (28-29)), we find in Au gustine a notion o f the mental which is similar to that o f the later Descartes (one that turns on the subjectivity o f experience), it is not so obvious that the more radical " Cartesian" doubt was a later invention. While there seems little doubt that Descartes's use o f 'idea' is an innovation, the worry that we are trapped behind a veil o f mind-stuff or dream-stuff (whatever these turn out to be) seems not to be. 43Wilson (Descartes, 17ff.) has also noticed that the usual treatments o f the dreaming passage seem not to capture Descartes's full intent, and the differences between my Unknown Faculty Argument and her interpreta tion o f the dreaming passage may appear to be only cosmetic. While I am motivated by many o f the same considerations that worry her, the differ ences between us are in fact substantial. First, on her reading the dreaming passage is not instrumental in raising doubts about the Corporeal Existence Thesis. Second, she does not read the madness passage nor the painter analogy as part o f the argument o f the dreaming passage. Third, she iden tifies no connection between the dreaming passage and (what I am calling) UFD. And fourth, she conflates (in both her First and Sixth Meditation treatments) what I take Descartes to intend as two distinct dream-related skeptical doubts. My own position on each o f these four counts emerges at various stages o f the present paper. (12) T h e re are sensory experien ces that I take to be nonveridical that are qualitatively indistinguishable fro m those that I take as n orm a l and waking.
(13) T h e experien ces in (12) that I take to be n on veridical may be p rod u ced by som e unknown in tern al faculty (w ith ou t any assistance fro m extern al th in g s ).
( From what is said in [the First] Meditation it is clear enough that there is no criterion enabling us to distinguish our dreams from the waking state and from veridical sensations. And hence the images we have when we are awake and having sensations are not accidents that inhere in external objects, and are no proof that any such external object exists at all. So if we follow our senses, without exercising our reason in any way, we shall be justified in doubting whether anything exists. Yet although the senses occasionally deceive us with respect to ob jects which are very small or in the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are derived from the senses-for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-down, holding this piece o f paper in my hands, and so on. (Again, these hands, and my whole body-how can their existence be denied?)46 Unless perhaps I were to liken myself 44In the Discourse, the option o f supposing that the Corporeal Existence Thesis is called into question by the Deceiver Hypothesis is not available, since the Deceiver Hypothesis is never introduced.
45In my interpretation, I rely heavily on the view that in the Meditations, Descartes often advances his doctrines in dialectical fashion; cf. E. M. Cur ley, " Analysis in the Meditations:. The Quest for Clear and Distinct Ideas," in Essays on Descartes Meditations, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1986), 157f. More specifically, I understand the First Meditation skeptical arguments to mature by means o f skeptical proposals followed by protests followed by rejoinders or revisions.
46I have relied on the Anscombe-Geach translation here (in the angle brackets). CSM render Manus vero has ipsas, totumque hoc corpus meurn esse, to madmen, whose brains are so damaged by the persistent vapours o f melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that their heads are made o f earthen ware, or that they are pumpkins, or made o f glass. But such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad if I took anything from them as a model for myself. (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) CSM 2:13) As typically read, the madness passage presents us with an inter pretive dilem m a. A c c o rd in g to the usual reading, Descartes is here p rop o sin g the w o rry that we m igh t actually be mad. I f so, then ei ther Descartes thinks he is dismissing the w o rry in the brief, closing rem ark o f this passage, o r he does n o t (as the subsequent para graph can be read to su ggest). I f we suppose that Descartes intends to dismiss the w o rry here, his e ffo r t is deficien t; given his p ro ce qua ratione posset negari? as Again, how could it be denied that these hands or this whole body are mine?' But the translation is strained. First, the singular meum is taken as the complement o f the plural 'these hands and body' rather than as the complement o f the singular 'this body' . Second, the context favors Anscombe-Geach. The meditator's worry is not whether his body is his. None o f the examples suggest this. Moreover, the passage indicates that the worry initially raised by madness is renewed after con sideration o f dreaming. Yet dreaming is not typically taken as questioning whether our apparent bodies are ours. Nor does the conclusion drawn from the dreaming passage suggest that it is. Rather, the conclusion drawn suggests a worry about existence.
It Random House, 1968) , suggests that the madness worry is " not pursued, possibly because it might seem offensive to the reader" (29). Wilson notes that the dismissal o f the madness worry is " rather arbitrary" given that Descartes " is prepared to doubt that he's awake" (.Descartes, 23). And Harry Frankfurt, in Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970) , proposes that Descartes " simply dismisses the possibility o f his own madness with the remark that it would not be reasonable for him to en-suppose that Descartes is n o t h ere dismissing the worry, then we are le ft with the p rob lem o f u nderstanding why he thinks the o b servation (in the subsequent paragraph ) that we som etim es have crazy dream s is supposed to m otivate the w o rry that we are insane.
This dilem m a can be avoided, as the text supports an alternative reading. Rather than the w orry that I m igh t actually be mad, the w orry is that fo r all I know my own sensory p erception may be n o m ore veracious, bein g on n o better fo o tin g ,48 than that o f the mad man. T h e assumption is that w hile m adm en take their own sensory experien ce as n orm al and veridical-as d o we-the rest o f us o f know they are deranged, as Descartes's exam ples convey: they per ceive themselves as " dressed in purple w hen they are n aked," or even " that they are pum pkins." T h e aim o f the doubt is to make the m editator w orry that his own sane w orld is n o better conn ected with external reality than the m adm an 's world. A n d as such, the appeal to madness seems best thou ght o f as the initial skeptical p ro posal-in tended to support (12) and (1 3 T h e m editator flipp an tly dismisses the com parison to the m ad man, only to ren ew it p rom ptly as the dialectic proceeds to a con sideration o f dreams. A t first glance, the very suggestion that in sanity serves as a suitable ben ch m ark fo r appraising his own sanity seems absurd. O n second thought, however, the m ed itator notices that his own dream experien ces are at least as bizarre as those he calls insane.
tertain it" (37). According to Frankfurt, in raising the problem o f madness Descartes has raised a worry about reason itself. And, thinks Frankfurt, the meditator cannot but assume his own sanity, for " if he were to begin by suspending the judgment that he is reasonable, he would be unable ever to reestablish his confidence in his own ability to carry out his task. For if he were to entertain doubts about his own rationality, he would naturally be bound to suspect any reasoning by which he might attempt to establish his sanity" (38). Granting Frankfurt's reading, it should surprise us that Descartes reintroduces the worry about reason itself in conjunction with the Deceiver Hypothesis (as Frankfurt holds). Frankfurt's eventual expla nation is that the meditator " properly supposes himself free o f all defects or deficiencies that would render him less qualified than others to conduct the inquiry [as in madness]. But he does not, o f course, suppose that he is exempt from incapacities uniformly affecting all human minds [as suggested by the Deceiver Hypothesis]" (83, italics mine).
48nisi me forte comparem nescio quibus insanis . . . (AT 7:18).
A brilliant piece o f reasoning! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, and regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as mad men do when awake-indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. (AT 7:19, CSM 2:13) Since the initial dismissal o f the com parison to the m adm an was ju stified by appeal to the disparity betw een madness and sanitythey think " they are pum pkins," and the like-it is appropriate that the m editator sarcastically describes such dismissal as a brilliant 49Cf. the Optics, where he explains that at the level o f physiology the (active) causal mechanism o f each is largely the same (AT 6:141).
50An exception is The Search for Truth, where Descartes again raises the madness worry. Eudoxus (Descartes's spokesperson) asks o f Polyander, have you never seen one of those melancholic individuals who think themselves to be vases, or take some part of their body to be enormous; they will swear that what they see and touch is just as they imagine it to be. To be sure, a good man would be indignant if you told him that his beliefs cannot have any more rational basis than theirs, since he relies, like them, on what the senses and imagination rep resent to him. But you cannot take it amiss if I ask whether you are not, like all men, liable to fall asleep, and whether you cannot think, while asleep, that you are seeing me, that you are walking in this garden, that the sun is shining-in brief, all the things of which you now believe you are utterly certain. Have you never heard this expression of astonishment in comedies: 'Am I awake or asleep?' How can you be certain that your life is not a continuous dream, and that ev erything you think you learn through your senses is not false now, just as much as when you are asleep? (AT 10:511-12, CSM 2 :407-8 )
The similarities between this account and the reading I am offering o f the First Meditation are noteworthy. First, the worry here is not whether we are actually insane, but whether our sense perception might be no more reliable than that o f the insane. Second, the appeal to insanity is intended to support the same claim as the appeal to dreaming. Third, the appeal to insanity is not pursued since it is less persuasive than the case o f dreaming. And fourth, the argument raises the worry that some unknown faculty or potentiality o f the mind may produce waking experiences in the manner that dream ex periences are produced-it does so by implicit appeal to AST.
T h e dialectic continues:
How often, asleep at night, am I convinced o f just such familiar eventsthat I am here in my dressing-gown, sitting by the fire-when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! Yet at the moment my eyes are certainly wide awake when I look at this piece o f paper; I shake my head and it is not asleep; as I stretch out and feel my hand I do so deliberately, and I know what I am doing. All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure signs by means o f which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only rein forces the notion that I may be asleep. (AT 7:19, CSM 2:13) Both the fact and the m anner o f Descartes's emphasis on (12) here seem best explained by the nature o f the historical debate. Recall that the Stoic (antiskeptical) strategy was to " cling tooth and nail" to the claim that the presentations o f madness and dreams " are devoid o f perspicuity," and the response o f the Academ y was to stress " that no presentation p roceedin g from a true object is such that a presentation proceedin g from a false one m ight n ot also be o f the same fo rm ." Historically, then, A S T has not stood in n eed o f justification; (12) has. 14; see especially 578 and 591f. where she concludes o f both that they are specifically susceptible to the indistinguishability problem that my (12) brings out.
52Cf. G. E. Moore, in his 'A Defense o f Common Sense," where he suggests that it is claims including precisely this sort-the location o f one's body, what one is wearing, what one is holding in one's hands, etc.-which constitute " obvious truisms" that he " know [s] , with certainty, to be true" (Philosophical Papers (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 32-33).
" objects which are very small o r in the distance," he is not likely to concede this o f the close-up and familiar examples Descartes chooses.
In effect, Descartes thinks he establishes that
(1 2 )' T h e re are sensory experien ces that I take to be nonveridical that are qualitatively indistinguishable fro m those that I take as m y m ost perspicuous, which, i f accepted, w ou ld leave little dou bt in his readers that ( 1 2 ) is the case. real, extern al objects.54 As Th om as writes, " T h e source o f the im ag 53What counts as external, and for whom, are difficult historical problems. While it is clear that, for Descartes, the external world includes even the meditator's body, it is not so clear how to understand the pre-Cartesian med itator's view, and his account here o f dreams is problematic. Since by this stage o f the Third Meditation the meditator is surely in step with the Cartesian view o f externality, I suggest we take the meditator to be saying here that he has always thought that dream-stuff (whatever that turns out to be) is produced solely by means o f mind-stuff (whatever that turns out to b e).
Note also that 'any' in 'without any assistance from external things' [absque ulla rerum externarum ope] underscores an occasionally bothersome problem in the Meditations, that o f voice. Is the meditator intended to represent the Aristotelian or the untutored man o f common sense-or both? It is, after all, false o f Aristotelians that they have always thought that the causal story behind dreams excludes any reference whatever to exter nal, corporeal things. And in the passage just cited, from The Search for Truth, the speaker's remark that all his ideas might be " formed by them selves, just as similar ideas are formed whenever [he is] asleep," is equally unAristotelian. Interestingly, in The Search for Truth Descartes uses two char acters, Epistemon and Polyander (an Aristotelian and a common man, respectively), in order to express the views that in the Meditations are ex pressed in the single voice o f the meditator. Predictably, it is Polyander who endorses the above causal story o f dreams. Perhaps less expected is that the meditator's First Meditation claim that " whatever [he has] up till now accepted as most true [he has] acquired either from the senses or through the senses" (A T 7:18, CSM 2:12) need not tag him as Aristotelian: in the The Search for Truth, the very same tenet is attributed to Polyander (AT 10:510, cf. also 10:512)-Descartes, in fact, holds that everyone suffers from a preoccupation with the senses (cf. Principles 1.71). Since in other texts, such as the painter analogy (which we are about to consider), the meditator is surely speaking on behalf o f the Aristotelian, it is perhaps best to understand the meditator's pre-Cartesian persona as schizophrenically vacillating between a schoolman and a commoner. 54On this account, the sensible forms o f the external objects o f waking sensation affect the senses in a manner that Aristotle likened to a signetring leaving its impress on a piece o f wax (De Anima 11.12 424a), a process thought to guarantee veridicality (cf. De Anima III. Or if perhaps [the painters] manage to think up something so new that nothing remotely similar has ever been seen before-something which is therefore completely fictitious and unreal-at least the col ours used in the composition must be real. By similar reasoning, al though these general kinds o f things-eyes, head, hands and so oncould be imaginary, it must at least be admitted that certain other even simpler and more universal things are real. These are as it were the real colours from which we form all the images o f things, whether true or false, that occur in our thought. (AT 7:20, Just as the pain ter n eed n ot fashion the im ages on h er canvas after anything real and existing, perhaps also m y own sensory ideas are 58The meditator proposes that the list o f such simple ideas " appears to include corporeal nature in general, and its extension; the shape o f ex tended things; the quantity, or size and number o f these things; the place in which they may exist, the time through which they may endure, and so on" (AT 7:20, CSM 2:14; italics mine). It is not uncommon for commen tators to try to read this list in light o f the Cartesian doctrine concerning simple natures; cf., for instance, Jean-Luc Marion, " Cartesian Metaphysics: The Simple Nature," in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) . But such read ings seem implausible given that the meditator is under hyperbolic doubt: At this stage o f the Meditations, Descartes has no right to advance any doctrines (not to mention Cartesian doctrines) that are not related to the procedure o f doubt-especially given, as we have seen, that the meditator confesses to being an empiricist o f some sort rather than a Cartesian. In conversation, Calvin Normore has suggested what seems to me a plausible account o f this list, namely, that it would have likely been taken by Des cartes's Aristotelian readers to be an elliptical list o f Aristotle's ten cate gories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, condi tion, action, and passion). This suggestion complements my own reading o f the passage, since the categories are, for an Aristotelian, the basic build ing blocks for our conceptual organization o f the world; granting the pos sibility o f the nativist account, the categories would be as a color wheel from which some mental faculty might paint the myriad images o f material things. And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that there is an omnipotent God who made me the kind o f creature that I am. How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is 59According to Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, material objects are composites o f matter and form, and the knowledge claims from the natural sciences, such as Descartes here mentions, refer to these composite sensi ble particulars. Says Ockham, " the philosophy o f nature deals primarily with sensible substances composed o f matter and form " -their proposi tions stand for real (external and composite) no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? (AT 7:21, CSM 2:14) But the ob jection is flawed. Th is text does n ot show that the lems: (i) the w orry that I m igh t n ow be asleep, since som e ex p e 62In The Search for Truth, Descartes uses the Deceiver Hypothesis in pre cisely this way. He has Eudoxus say, how do you know " that everything you think you learn through your senses is not false now, just as much as when you are asleep? In particular, how can you be certain o f this when you have learned that you were created by a superior being who, being all-powerful, would have found it no more difficult to create us just as I am describing, than to create us as you think you are?" (10) (11) (12) CSM 2:408) 63Interestingly, in what is perhaps the earliest known historical antece dent o f the Deceiver Hypothesis, Cicero reports that one o f the issues disputed by the Academics and the Stoics was the possibility o f dreams sent by a deity who had the power to make nonveridical perception appear ve ridical (Acad. , while responding to an objection that it is possible that God might be, in some absolute sense, a deceiver in spite o f what reason shows, Descartes dismisses the worry since there are no conceivable grounds by which our belief in God's benevolence could be corrected. In effect, he dismisses the objection as a pseudoproblem: it is " no objection for someone to make out that [our most certain] truths might appear false to God or to an angel," and we need not " listen to anyone who makes up this kind o f story" (AT 7:146, CSM 2:104). For Descartes, the problems in (i) and (ii) are meaningful, precisely because we do have the capacity to solve them. 67Recall that in establishing the External Cause Thesis, the Sixth Med itation argument rules out UFD only to the extent that active unknown mental faculties are eliminated. And while this is inconsistent with (13) as stated, some weaker version o f (13)-one that allows that the active causes o f sensory ideas are corporeal-remains unchallenged. is on e stripped o f all but the quantitative features am enable to m echanical ex p la n a tio n ,68 and on e whose causal ro le in sensation 68A s for the qualitative features from the old conception o f body, such as " that the heat in a body is something exactly resembling the idea o f heat which is in me; or that when a body is white or green, the selfsame whiteness or greenness which I perceive through my senses is present in the body; or that in a body which is bitter or sweet there is the selfsame taste which I experience, and so on" (A T 7:82, CSM 2:56-57), the First Meditation doubts that undermine the judgment that such features really exist in bodies never are resolved. The Sixth Meditation meditator con is lim ited to that o f an active cause. Thus, the m ed itator qualifies the conclusion o f his Sixth M ed itation p r o o f fo r the C o rp orea l Existence Thesis by observin g that the co rp o rea l substances caus in g his sensory ideas " may n o t all exist in a way that exactly cor responds with [his] sensory grasp o f th e m " (A T 7:80, CSM 2:55); he does so, since he has n ot yet ru led out the possibility that he is asleep, and since to the exten t that U FD rem ains unresolved, it leaves in dou bt w h eth er there is any resem blance betw een co rp o real objects as p erceived and co rp o re a l objects in themselves. In Cartesian distin ction betw een the in tern al and the ex tern a l-the in tern al w orld consisting o f all and o n ly the events co n c e rn in g w hich we have (o r p oten tia lly h ave) im m ed ia te awareness-has relevan ce apart fro m substance dualism. A n d gra n tin g the dis tin ction in these term s, the secon d stage-( 2 ) ' thru ( 6 ) -o f Descludes: " Although I feel heat when I go near a fire and feel pain when I go too near, there is no convincing argument for supposing that there is something in the fire which resembles the heat, any more than for sup posing that there is something which resembles the pain. There is simply reason to suppose that there is something in the fire, whatever it may eventually turn out to be, which produces in us the feelings o f heat or pain" (AT 7:83, CSM 2:57). 69Except insofar as they have some determinable size, shape, motion, or other quantifiable features.
70Cf. Principles 1.71, II.4, and 8b:359. 71In his unpublished " Descartes on the Innate Idea o f Body," Alan Nel son elaborates on this claim in his treatment o f Descartes's theory o f in nateness, a treatment from which I have benefited.
cartes's Sixth M ed ita tio n a rgu m en t is an in terestin g c o n te n d e r fo r establishing the existen ce o f an ex tern a l w o rld (n e v e r m in d its n atu re).
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